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Abstract1
Using data from both company records and an insurance provider, the authors develop a
direct measure of out-of-pocket costs incurred by employees choosing a health care plan.
Previous studies have used characteristics of medical plans and demographic variables as
proxies for OPC. By better specifying the consequences of the health care choice, the authors
show how the demand for health plans is kinked in a manner consistent with risk aversion. The
results suggest that using the proposed OPC measure can help practitioners and researchers
better understand and predict the pattern of employee health care benefit choices.
                                                 
1 This research was in part supported by funds from the Center for Advanced Human Resource
Studies. The authors thank Melissa Barringer, Olivia Mitchell, and Theresa Welbourne for their assistance
and suggestions.
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Flexible benefit plans, which offer employees choices among the benefits they receive
from their employer, have enjoyed increasing popularity and expanding attention from scholars.
Such plans are attractive to employers because they can reduce costs. Employers can
contribute a fixed amount of money to pay for a basic level of employee benefits, and
employees contribute additional funds if they desire expanded coverage (Employee Benefit
Research Institute 1991; Davis, Giles & Feild 1988). Flexible benefits are also attractive
because employees when offered choice might select benefits that best meet their individual
needs, and thus experience greater satisfaction, motivation and organizational loyalty (Beam &
McFadden 1988; DeCenzo & Holoviak 1990; Rosenbloom & Hallman 1981). To gain the
advantages of flexible benefits, employees must be capable and motivated to make choices that
benefit them. So, it is important for researchers and practitioners to understand the reasons
behind choices.
Employers can provide choices for a large array of employee benefits (e.g., vacations,
flexible hours, etc.), but health care benefits deserve special attention. Containing health care
costs is the primary reason cited by companies for implementing flexible benefits plans (EBRI
1991), health care benefits are the most common benefit included in flexible benefit plans (EBRI
1991 1993), health care choices are frequently provided for employees even if other choices are
not implemented (Hewitt 1994), and health care benefit satisfaction is a highly significant
predictor of overall benefits satisfaction (Danehower & Lust 1995). Understanding health care
benefit choices is particularly important to understanding employee benefit choices in general.
Moreover, investigating health care benefit choices offers a unique opportunity to test labor
economic and other behavioral theories, which can potentially help policy makers better predict
employee choices and better design benefit plans to support employee and organizational
goals.
Given their increasing importance, it is not surprising that recent research has examined
the patterns of health care benefit choices (Barringer & Mitchell 1994; Feldman, Finch, Dowd &
Cassou 1989; Holmer 1984; Short & Taylor 1989; Welch 1986). This research has used the
theory of expected utility maximization (EUM) and has focused on how cost-related health care
plan elements affect employee choices. This work has provided valuable insights into the
sensitivity of employee choices to these cost-related elements. However, all prior research has
used indirect measures of the true cost of benefit choices to employees, and thus has not fully
specified individual utility functions. The present study introduces a more complete measure of
the cost or "price" of health-care benefit choices: "out-of-pocket costs" (OPC).
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Expected Utility Maximization Theory
EUM theory predicts that individuals make choices in ways that attempt to maximize
their expected future utility (Friedman & Savage 1948). EUM suggests employees choose
health-care benefits to maximize their expected futureutility and that individual utility functions
partly reflect anticipated future medical costs (Feldstein 1988; Friedman 1974; Holmer 1984;
Barringer & Mitchell 1994). Specifically, employees may calculate potential future medical costs
for each health care option and then chose the least-cost alternative (Friedman 1974; Marquis &
Holmer 1986).
No prior study has measured anticipated OPC and its relationship to health care
decisions. Rather, studies have used characteristics of health care plans and proxies for health
care demand to ascertain the relationship between price and health care choice. Research has
shown that plan characteristics, such as premium, deductible, and co-p yment, affect health
care choice decisions (Barringer & Mitchell 1994; Feldman et al. 1989; Holmer 1984; Marquis &
Holmer 1986; McGuire 1981; Short & Taylor 1989; Welch 1986). However, price elasticity
estimates from these studies have varied greatly. Studies have estimated health care need
through aggregations of medical expense data from similar demographic groups (Friedman
1974; Marquis & Holmer 1984) or through proxies of employee health care demands (Barringer
& Mitchell 1994; Feldman et al. 1989; McGuire 1981). A better specification of individual utility
functions would require measuring each employee's anticipated out-of-pocket costs for each
health care option to predict employee health care choices, as expressed in the following
equation.
Pr(Choicei.p) = f(OPCi,p + e) (1)
where:
Pr(Choicei,p) = Probability of individual i choosing Plan p
OPC i,p          = Out-of-Pocket Costs of Plan p for individual i.
e                  =  the error term, e = N(0,1)
Estimating Total Out-of-Pocket Costs
Studies have shown that individual health care choices are sensitive to individual plan
characteristics, but this does not necessarily imply sensitivity to OPC. Total OPC depends on
relationships among many health-care plan components, including the insurance premium, the
co-payment, out-of-pocket caps, and the deductible, but prior research h s typically focused on
only one or two of these components. Total OPC also depends on the individual's use of
medical care. For example, for an employee requiring dialysis, a high-premium plan that
provides generous coverage for dialysis procedures may well produce lower OPC than a
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lower-premium plan that requires significant cost-sharing for dialysis treatments. Conversely, for
employees who do not require dialysis, the high-premium plan may have the highest OPC,
because these employees would be paying a high premium for coverage they never use. Thus,
a complete examination of health-care plan "prices" requires integrating medical care use with
the cost-related plan components.
Research has used demographic variables to approximate demand for health care.
McGuire (1981) used personal and socioeconomic characteristics-salary, sex, age, race, job
status and education-to control for some demand effects. Similarly, Barringer and Mitchell
(1994) used demographic factors, including sex, age, and marital status. Prior studies have
found some significant relationships between demographic variables and choice (Barringer &
Mitchell 1994; Feldman et al. 1989; Holmer 1984; McGuire 1981; Short & Taylor 1989), but the
link between medical expenses and choice in a flexible benefits environment has not been
directly tested. Thus, past research has been based on the following model:
             Pr(Choicei,p) = f(Demographicsi + Plan Paymentsp + e) (2)
One limitation of this model is that demographic variables may reflect factors other than
medical expenses, such as risk aversion. For example, older employees may choose more
comprehensive coverage because it reduces risk, not because of expected higher medical
costs. Another limitation is the imperfect relationship between demographics and medical
expenses. A few studies do show some statistically significant relationships between
demographics and medical costs. Women were found to use more medical services than men
(Sindelar 1982), and married people had less need for formal medical care (Taubman & Rosen
1982). However, in a longitudinal study of 35,000 people in the Netherlands, van Vliet (1992)
regressed health care expenditures on age, sex, coverage of family-doctor care,
treatment in hospital, and location of subject. The R2 of this regression was .021. Van
Vliet did not include some potentially important variables (i.e., number of children), nor did he
perform transformations to normalize skewed distributions which, but the results suggest that
medical expenses are only imperfectly associated with demographic factors. Comparing
Equations 1 and 2 reveals the implicit assumption that the combination of demographics and
plan payments provide a proxy for OPC. In the present study, we will test this assumption
directly.
Hypotheses
Based on prior research and the limited available empirical data, we propose the
following hypotheses:
H1: Being female will be positively associated with medical expenses.
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H2: Marriage will be negatively associated with medical expenses.
H3: Number of children will be positively associated with medical expenses.
H4: Age will be positively associated with medical expenses.
H5: The combination of demographic characteristics will be significantly related to total
medical expenses.
Previous research has also suggested relationships between plan characteristics and
OPC. Specifically, using plan characteristics such as premium and deductible to test price
sensitivity implies that choosing a high-premium plan or high-deductible plan would be positively
associated with OPC. However, if employees are sensitive to total costs, then we must consider
the plan characteristics in conjunction with one another. When employees must choose
between benefit alternatives, the relative OPC advantage of each alternative will best reflect the
cost tradeoff. Individual and plan characteristics may predict plan choices when used alone, but
their predictive value should be reduced when the OPC advantage of each plan choice is added
to the model. Thus, we propose:
H6: The OPC advantage of each plan alternative will be significantly positively
correlated with the probability of choosing that plan.
H7: The OPC advantage of each plan alternative will be more strongly associated with
choice than will the vector of demographics and plan characteristics.
H8: The OPC advantage of each plan alternative will be significant and will mediate the
effects of plan characteristics on employee choices.
As mentioned earlier, research has hypothesized that demographics are linked to the
expected level of medical expenses; however, researchers have also noted that some
demographic characteristics (e.g., age, sex, marital status, number of children) may be
associated with different health-care related preferences (Barringer & Mitchell 1994; Feldman et
al. 1989). Therefore,
H9: Demographic variables will be related to plan choice, even after controlling for the
OPC advantage of each plan.
Actual OPC can only be measured retrospectively. One calculates the OPC that
employees incurred after making their benefits choices and accumulating medical expenses.
Obviously, this measure of OPC does not necessarily capture the anticipated OPC facing each
employee at the time they made their choices, which is the most appropriate variable in EUM
theory. Future medical costs are uncertain, and we have little evidence suggesting whether
employees can accurately predict them. Additionally, a moral hazard effect may be present.
Employees may change their medical expenditures depending on their plan selection. OPC may
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therefore be endogenous to plan choice, and thus price minimization may be a reflection of
more than simply being able to predict future expenditures. Nonetheless, even a retrospective
OPC measure is informative because it provides a better specification of individual utility values
under "best possible" assumptions. If OPC proves to predict prior employee choices, this will
suggest that employees behave as if they could predict their future medical expenses or were
aware of price and altered their behavior to take advantage of their health care plan selection.
Risk and Benefit Plan Choices
Though the focus of recent research has been on the effects of price or costs on
employee benefit choices, it is obvious that the concept of "utility" in EUM theory encompasses
more than simply cost. "Individuals must ...choose among alternatives that differ, among other
things, in the degree of risk to which the individual will be subject. The clearest examples are
provided by insurance and gambling (Friedman & Savage 1948: 279)." Thus, expected cost is
probably a significant, but not exclusive consideration when employees choose benefits. Risk
may also play a role (Feldstein 1988).
Theoretical and empirical research suggests that risk aversion associates with health
care insurance choices (Barringer & Mitchell 1994; Feldstein 1988; Friedman 1974; Friedman &
Savage 1948; Marquis & Holmer 1984; Short & Taylor 1989). Risk aversion may be helpful in
explaining a common, but somewhat anomalous finding in prior benefits research. Several
studies (Barringer & Mitchell 1994; Holmer 1984) have found that employees with higher
incomes seem inclined to choose a high-coverage FFS plan over an HMO or lower-premium
FFS (Barringer & Mitchell 1994), and price-elasticity is negatively related to family income
(Holmer 1984). The effect of income on choices remains, even after controlling for factors that
reflect the likelihood that the employee will incur high medical expenses (e.g., age, number of
children, marriage, etc.). Why would high-income individuals choose high-premium,
high-protection plans? Perhaps the answer is risk aversion.
Evidence from decision theory shows that individuals exhibit significantly greater
preferences for options that are framed as insurance premiums paid to avoid an uncertain future
loss, than when the insurance premiums are framed as certain losses, even though the
expected values of the options are the same (Bazerman 1994: 63-66). Applying these findings
to health-care benefit choice, individuals might be expected to prefer benefit options offering
protection against the high out- f-pocket expenses associated with serious medical problems,
even when the probability of incurring such problems is low. If the desire for such protection is
partially independent of the desire to minimize OPC, one would expect employees with greater
disposable income to purchase "high-premium, high-protection" choices more frequently,
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because they can afford to indulge their preference for risk minimization, even when the
expected OPC of the risk-protective choice is actually higher than the OPC of a lower-premium
plan. Individuals may think, "I know I will probably never use it, but I'd like to be fully protected."
While the potential role of risk aversion in benefit choices has been noted before, prior
research has not tested it directly. One problem has been that the same variables that are used
as proxies for health care demand and benefit-plan costs (e.g., demographics, premium, and
co-payments) also associate with individual risk aversion and the actual risk facing each
individual. If a more direct measure of OPC is available, it may capture the "price" factors more
completely, thus allowing the risk effects to be estimated more precisely.
Thus, including OPC as a predictor of benefits choices may better control for the
cost-related elements of benefits choices, and thus allow a more precise examination of risk. Of
course, risk aversion is only one of the non-cost utility attributes, and many are even more
difficult to measure. Employees may prefer plans because they can continue to see their
favorite physician or avoid paperwork. They may choose solely by duplicating the choices of
co-workers whom they respect without explicitly considering costs or other factors. Such
decision attributes are likely to be highly individual-specific, and not as easily observed as costs
or risk. Still, because price and risk figure prominently in theories of benefit choice, it is useful to
investigate them, recognizing that even this model will still be incomplete.
If the anticipated costs of health-care benefit options are roughly the same, individuals
may choose based on the relative risk protection of the choices. Employees may consider risk
protection separately from OPC. If so, then when employees anticipate roughly equal OPC
levels for competing benefit plan alternatives, they will opt for the choice that provides the
greater perceived protection against serious medical calamities. Thus, benefit choices would be
more sensitive to OPC for benefit options that afford less protection against serious
medical calamities, and vice versa. Figure 1 shows the functional form of this
anticipated relationship.
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Figure 1
Hypothesized Relationship Between Regret and Plan choice
Figure 1 depicts a hypothetical situation involving two benefit plans. We assume that
Plan A carries a higher premium, but also provides superior protection against the costs of
serious medical calamities, while Plan B carries a lower premium, but provides less protection
against the costs of serious medical calamities. The vertical axis depicts the probability of
choosing the high-premium plan (Plan A). To allow the choice functions for both plans to be
mapped on the same graph, the horizontal axis represents a variable called "Regret." Regret
captures the OPC advantage of one plan choice versus another. It is simply the financial
consequence of making a non-cost-optimal choice. For any individual with known medical costs,
it is possible to calculate what their OPC would be for each health plan option. For each option,
and for each individual, Regret is defined as the difference between the OPC of that option, less
the OPC of the lowest-cost alternative. Thus, Regret is zero if a particular option is the
lowest-cost alternative. If an option is ot the lowest-cost alternative, Regret is positive, and
Regret increases as the difference between the OPC of a particular choice and the OPC of the
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lowest-cost choice increases. In the two-option case, Regret represents the "cost" of choosing
one option over the other.
In Figure 1, the zero point on the X-axis represents zero Regret for both options. Points
to the left of zero represent situations in which choosing Plan A affords increasingly greater
advantage in minimizing OPC (i.e., RegretA = 0, RegretB > 0). Points to the right of zero
represent situations in which choosing Plan B affords increasingly greater advantage in
minimizing OPC (i.e., RegretA > 0, RegretB = 0). Figure 1 depicts two potential "utility functions,"
reflecting different combinations of uncertainty and taste for risk protection. Consider the
situation in which risk protection is irrelevant (Line ABC in Figure 1). Under these conditions,
choices will be governed largely by cost differences, so one should see the probability of
choosing Plan A increase as its OPC advantage increases to Point A in Figure 1, and vice versa
as the OPC advantage of Plan B increases to Point C in Figure 1. The line intersects the vertical
axis at .50 (Point B in Figure 1) because at zero Regret the two plans provide identical OPC and
the choice is random.
Theory on the demand for health insurance, though, suggests that economic variables,
plan characteristics, income, risk preferences, and the distribution of potential losses affect this
demand (Feldstein 1988). When both OPC and risk protection are relevant utility attributes, the
choice function will resemble Line DEF in Figure 1. The probability of choosing Plan A is still
high when Plan A produces much lower OPC (Point D in Figure 1). However, as the OPC
advantage of Plan A decreases to zero, the probability of choosing Plan A decreases only
slightly, and the line intersects the zero point at a much higher level. This is because although
Plan B becomes more attractive as one moves closer to the zero point, Plan A maintains an
advantage due to its superior risk protection. In fact, we would expect the probability of choosing
Plan A to remain high even when Plan B has a small OPC advantage (slightly to the right of the
zero point), because risk-averse employees will accept a small OPC "penalty" to have the risk
protection of Plan A. At some point, as the OPC advantage of Plan B becomes greater, we
should see increased sensitivity to the OPC difference, and the choice function should drop
more steeply as the Regret associated with choosing Plan A increases (beyond Point E in
Figure 1). Of course the exact locations of Points D, E and F for any particular sample of
employees cannot be precisely predicted. They will depend on the magnitude of the OPC
differences between the plans, the risk aversion of the employees, and the accuracy with which
employees can anticipate their future medical costs. Still, if the effect is reasonably strong, it
should be possible to detect the non-linearity described above. Thus,
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H10: The choice function will resemble line DEF in Figure 1, more than it will resemble
line ABC.
Setting and Sample
This study examines benefit choices among employees of a medium-sized
manufacturing firm. The organization had two manufacturing plants, one of which offered a
choice of medical plans and employed 309 people. This choice was introduced in 1991.
Prior to 1991, all employees were enrolled in a single medical plan, here called Plan A.
In 1991, employees at this particular plant were offered a new choice, here called Plan B. From
the company archival data base, information from 1992 was available on employee benefit
choices, employee age, marital status, and number of children, for employees in the plant that
offered the choice. In addition, matched data on medical procedure charges for each employee
were collected from the insurance company that administered the health care plan. A total of
287 cases had complete data on all variables. The average age of the sample was 36 years,
63% were male, 82% were married, and employees had an average of 1.9 children (maximum
of 7). A summary of the two health insurance plans offered appears in Table 1. The plans differ
with regard to the treatment of hospitalization and in-hospital treatments, premiums,
deductibles, and out-of-pocket caps.
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Both plans covered non-hospital medical claims in the same way, in that the company
paid 80% of such expenses beyond a deductible, and 100% once the out-of-pocket maximum
had been reached. Plan A covered the full cost of up to 120 days of hospitalization and
in-hospital treatments. Under Plan B, hospital claims were treated similarly to non-hospital
medical claims, as described above. By paying the higher premium for Plan A, an employee
purchased a lower deductible, plus protection against the chance of paying 20% of
hospital-related costs beyond the deductible, up to the out-of-pocket maximum. In the most
extreme case, if an employee only incurred hospital expenses and incurred enough to reach the
out-of-pocket maximum under Plan B, Plan A would produce an OPC of $0, excluding the
premium, while choosing Plan B would produce an OPC of $2400, excluding the premium. In
sum, Plan A afforded more protection against the costs associated with serious medical
conditions requiring lengthy hospitalization, but at a higher premium. For each employee,
medical claims data, benefit plan characteristics, and choices were used to calculate total
medical expenses and all OPC and Regret measures.
The similarities between the two choices provided a unique advantage for the present
study. The plans differed only in their premium, deductible and payment schedule. Potentially
confounding differences in access to providers, claims procedures, communication channels,
etc. were controlled. Thus, observed choice patterns are more easily interpreted within the
theoretical framework proposed here. In a very real sense, this situation offered a more
controlled "field experiment" than prior research in which many of these factors were
confounded with differences in cost-related plan elements. Moreover, the purity of the choice
situation is not unusual (EBRI 1991 1993; Hewitt 1994; U.S. BLS 1990), so findings are likely to
generalize to many other situations.
Results
Table 2 contains the correlation matrix for all variables used in this study. The first five
rows/columns reflect the demographic characteristics. The sixth row reflects the natural
logarithm of the total medical expenses incurred by the employee. The seventh row reflects the
employee's choice (Plan A =1; Plan B = 0).  The next two rows reflect the actual OPC and
Regret incurred by the employee. Rows 10 through 13 report the OPC that would have been
incurred if the employee chose Plan A, the OPC if choosing Plan B, the Regret if choosing Plan
A, and the Regret if choosing Plan B. Row 14 is the premium of the chosen plan, and row 15
reflects the deductible of the chosen plan. The remaining four rows reflect the premiums and
deductibles that would have been incurred if choosing each plan.
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Before discussing the specific hypotheses, certain correlation patterns should be
explained. There are a large number of quite large correlations that might at first cause concern
about multicollinearity. However, many of these correlations are simply a function of the way
benefits are constructed, or of the OPC calculation. For example, marital status and number of
children (columns 2 and 3) are highly correlated with all variables in rows 14 through 19, which
reflect the cost elements of the benefit choices. This is expected, as the premiums and
deductibles explicitly differ with the number of dependents. Total medical expenses (column 6)
shows high correlations with measures of OPC, Regret and plan cost characteristics, which is
generally expected due to the direct relationship between plan cost elements and these
cost-related measures. OPC (column 8) correlates with measures of costs and Regret because
it is functionally calculated from these components.
The correlations between OPC, OPCA, and OPCB should be noted. Because the plans
reimbursed non-hospital related medical expense equally, for many employees the OPC of each
plan only differed with regard to the premium. Thus, for many cases the two valu s c vary
perfectly. This explains the large correlation between the OPC values associated with each
plan. Because actual OPC is equal to the OPC of the chosen plan, and because most
employees chose Plan A, OPC and OPCA are almost perfectly correlated. However, because
the OPC advantage of a plan (i.e., Regret) is a function of the difference in OPC values, Regret
does not have this level of correlation with the OPC values. Because Regret will be used in the
subsequent analyses, we remove the danger of collinearity problems that we might face had we
used incurred OPC.
Finally, variables in rows 10 through 19 exhibit significant associations because they
reflect costs or cost advantages of the benefit plans. It is interesting to note, however, that in
most cases the correlations are much smaller than 1.0, suggesting that there are non-trivial
relationships between cost-related plan characteristics and the actual costs experienced by
employees. We now explore these relationships within the framework of the hypotheses.
Predicting Costs
The first four hypotheses can be examined using the correlations in columns one
through six, in Table 2. Contrary to Hl and H4, being female and being older were not
associated with higher medical expenses (Row 6). Apparently, in this sample, gender and age
were imperfect univariate proxies for medical costs. Also, contrary to H2, being married was
positively correlated with medical expenses. Hypothesis H3 was supported: having more
children was positively related to medical expenses.
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The test of H5 largely contradicts van Vliet's (1992) findings and provides greater
support for the initial hypotheses. The results of the regression of total medical expenses on
sex, marital status, number of children, age, and age2 are shown in Table 3. The model explains
significantly more variance in medical expense (R2 = .16; Adj. R2 = .14) than were reported in
van Vliet's (1992) study.2 Additionally, marital status, number of children, age, and age2 were all
significant predictors (in the predicted directions), thus providing support for H2, H3, and H4. As
predicted, married people have lower medical expenses, but only after controlling for the effects
of number of children and age. Thus, contrary to the findings from the correlation analyses
reported above, H2 is supported. Second, if the age-squared term was not used, then the age
variable does not appear significant. In sum, some demographic variables had significant
relationships with medical expenses; however, a significant portion of medical expenses
remains unexplained.
Table 3
Medical Expenses as a Function of Demographic Characteristics
                                                                         b
Variable                                              (t-value)      
Sex -0.17
(0 = Male; 1 = Female) (1.26)
Marital Status    -0.83***
(0 = Single; 1 = Married) (4.19)
#Children     0.34**
(3.25)
Age    -0.21 **
(2.12)
Age2       0.0027**
(2.17)
__________________________________               
F-Statistic  10.36***
R2  .16
Adjusted R2  .14
Note: Dependent variable is log of total medical expenses
*p<.10;**p<.05;***p<.01
Correlations in Table 2 show that the premium of the chosen plan was significantly
related to incurred OPC and positively related to Regret. However, the deductible was not
related to OPC. Deductible was negatively related to Regret. In other words, those who chose
                                                 
2 A possible explanation for the discrepancy between these results and van Vliet's (1992) findings
is that the natural logarithm was used to transform the medical expense data to make the distribution
more normal. Had this transformation not been performed, the R2 would have been only .03 and only the
variable number of children would have appeared related to total medical expenses.
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Plan B, which had a larger deductible, ended up with lower levels of Regret on average. For
many employees, the premium advantage of Plan B was greater than the deductible
disadvantage. This suggests that interdependencies between the plan characteristics are
important when exploring choice.
Predicting Choice
Hypothesis H6 proposed that the likelihood of employees choosing a particular plan
would be significantly positively correlated with the OPC advantage of that choice. As shown in
Figure 1 and discussed earlier, Regret captures the relative OPC advantage of each plan.
Recall that RegretA equals zero when choosing Plan A produces the lowest OPC, and increases
as the OPC advantage of Plan B increases. The converse relationship holds for Regret.
Table 2 supports H6 in that the correlation between choosing Plan A (Column 7) is
significant and negative for RegretA (-0.39), and significant and positive for RegretB (0.23).
Interestingly, H6 is only partially supported when one examines only the OPC of each plan,
rather than their relative OPC advantage. Table 2 shows that the correlations between the
probability of choosing Plan A and OPCA and OPCB were 0.07 and 0.22, respectively. The
correlation between OPCA and choosing Plan A was not statistically significant. However, the
correlation between OPCB and choosing Plan A was significant and positive as predicted,
suggesting that as Plan B became more costly, employees were significantly more likely to
choose Plan A. This finding is consistent with the pattern proposed in Figure 1, and reinforces
the value of using OPC, and the relative OPC advantage of competing choices, to measure
benefit plan costs.
Model 1 in Table 4 regresses plan choice on demographic characteristics and the
premiums associated with Plan A and Plan B.3 Contrary to prior research, the model does not
significantly predict the probability of choosing Plan A, the high-premium plan (x2 = 8.24; df = 7;
n.s.). Plan premiums were not related to choosing the high-premium plan.4 Of the demographic
variables, sex was significantly related to choice, and age and age2 were marginally related to
choice. In the absence of an alternative measure of plan costs, this finding might lead to the
conclusion that employees were not sensitive to premiums or deductibles. An alternative
                                                                                                                                                    
3   In this two-choice situation, the Premium and Deductible are collinear.  So, we used the
Premium as the plan characteristic in the regressions, because it has been used most often in prior
research.
4 Results were also no different when the regression was run using the variables A-Premium and
A-Deductible, the variables B-Premium and B-Deductible, or the differences (A-Premium minus B-
Premium), and (A-Deductible minus B-Deductible).
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interpretation is that individual plan characteristics affect choice as they interact with other plan
characteristics and individual health care needs. Using OPC will allow us to examine this more
thoroughly.
Table 4
Determinants of Health Plan Choice: Logit Models
(Probability of Selecting Health Care Plan A as Reference Category)
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Model 1          Model 2 Model 3
Sex    0.33**          -   0.35**
(0 = Male; 1 = Female) (2.18) (2.11)
Married -0.17          - -0.37
(0 = Single; 1 = Married) (0.40) (0.73)
Number of Children 0.23          - 0.17
(1.41) (0.96)
(1.42) 
Age -0.22*          - 0.13
(1.71) (0.99)
Age2 0.0028*          - 0.0016
(1.69) (0.93)
Plan A Premium -0.00091          - 0.0040
(0.22) (0.79)
Plan B Premium -0.0024          - -0.015
(0.31)  (1.65)*
RegretA -          -0.0058***    -0.0081 ***
         (4.35) (4.85)
RegretB -       0.0029 0.0014
         (1.63) (0.94)
___________________________________________________________________________
-Log Likelihood 146.93     126.97 121.29
Pseduo R2 .03     .16 .20
________________________________________________________________________      
*p<.10;**p<.05; ***p<.01
Note: N = 287. Reduced model has a -Log Likelihood of 151.05. Models 2 and 3 are more
predictive than the reduced model and Model 1. Models 3 is not more predictive than Model 2.
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Model 2 in Table 4 begins to test the predictive power of OPC. A logistic regression was
used to model plan choice (Plan A = 1) on the OPC advantage of each plan (i.e., RegretA and
RegretB). RegretA is highly significant (p < .0001) and in the predicted direction. Consistent with
Hypothesis H8, the probability of Choosing Plan A decreases as RegretA incr ases. RegretB is a
marginally significant predictor of plan choice (t=1.63; p = .1032), which somewhat supports
hypothesis H8 and is consistent with the pattern of line DEF in Figure 1.
To test hypothesis H7, these two models were compared. A Chi-square test reveals that
Model 2 is more predictive than Model 1 (x2 = 39.92; df = 5; p < .0001), thus supporting the
predictions of hypothesis H9. Using Pseudo-R2 values to illustrate, Model 1 has an R2 of .03,
while Model 2 has an R2 of .16. These results further support H7.
Hypothesis H8 proposed that OPC captures the cost implications facing employees
better than plan characteristics, and H9 proposed that demographic variables would still have
an impact even after controlling for the effects of cost. If these hypotheses hold, the relationship
between the Plan A premium and Plan B premium should not be significant after controlling for
the linear effects of the OPC advantage of each choice; however, we expect demographics to
be significant predictors of choice. Model 3 in Table 4 shows the estimated logistic regression of
choosing Plan A on the various explanatory variables. The results provide mixed support for
these hypotheses.
Model 3 shows that RegretA is a highly significant predictor of choice. The coefficient for
RegretB is in the expected direction, but it is not significant. Overall, Model 3 is not more
predictive than Model 2 (x2 = 11.35; df = 7; n.s.).
The extent that Regret mediates the effects of plan premiums is unclear. Plan premiums
were not significant predictors in Model 1, so interpreting the effect of controlling for the OPC
advantage of each plan is questionable. Nonetheless, the OPC advantage of Plan A (RegretA)
remains significant.
The results from Model 3 support hypothesis H9. After controlling for the OPC
advantage of each plan, sex was still a significant predictor of choice. Interestingly, sex is the
only demographic variable that was significant in Model 3, yet was the only variable not
significant for the prediction of medical expenses (Table 3).
To test hypothesis H10, we constructed the plot shown in Figure 2, which depicts the
same relationships hypothesized in Figure 1. The plotted points in Figure 2 were constructed
from the predicted probabilities of choosing Plan A as computed from Model 3. Thus, controlling
for premium levels, demographic characteristics, and the OPC advantage of each plan, the
non-linear pattern of predicted choice probabilities closely resembles line DEF in Figure 1. It
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appears that for this sample, price-elasticity depends on whether the price difference favors
Plan A, which provides higher risk protection, or Plan B. When Plan A was the low-cost choices
(RegretB greater than zero), price elasticity equaled -0.03. In contrast, when Plan B was the
low-cost choice (RegretA greater than zero), price elasticity was -0.50.
5 Although the price
elasticity values vary depending on where along the Regret function price-se sit vity is
measured, these values do not differ greatly from the range of values reported in other studies
(e.g., Barringer & Mitchell 1994; Holmer 1984; Marquis & Holmer 1986; Short & Taylor 1989).
Choices appear to be more sensitive to OPC differences when the OPC difference favors the
less protective Plan B. When the two plans are approximately equivalent in their cost
implications, employees overwhelmingly seem to prefer the more protective plan.
Figure 2
Relationship Between Regret and Computed Probability of Plan Choice
                                                 
5 Elasticity of the probability of selecting health care plan A with respect to Regret equals
B*X*(1-P), where P is the probability of choosing Plan A and is predicted here at the means of the
independent variables for those with Regret greater than 0 for each price elasticity computation. For the
first estimate, P equaled 0.96, and the average Regret (X) was 498. For the second estimate, P equaled
0.70, and average Regret (X) was 206.
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Discussion and Conclusions
This study proposed a more direct measure of benefit costs, OPC, to explain and predict
employee health-care benefit choices. OPC and Regret were designed to better specify health
care costs to allow a greater understanding of the role that price sensitivity plays in health-care
benefit decisions. In the present sample of employees making actual benefit decisions, Regret
was significantly related to employee choices, and provided additional explanatory power
beyond an array of individual and plan characteristics typical of those used in prior research.
The results were generally consistent with the hypotheses. Moreover, adding Regret proved to
enhance not only predictions of employee choice, but controlled for cost-related factors in a way
that permitted direct tests of propositions regarding risk aversion. The relationship between
employee choices and Regret in Figures 1 and 2 suggests that such multi-dimensional utility
functions may be typical, and OPC may prove useful in isolating them.
OPC has not previously been measured and incorporated into studies of benefits
decisions. Thus, one contribution of the present study is to explain and draw attention to this
measure. Though the data required to calculate OPC often reside in at least two organizations
(in this case, the insurance administrator and the company), the construction of OPC is
straightforward and informative. We hope that one result of this study will motivate others to
apply these measurement techniques, and to refine and embellish the OPC measure. Other
fruitful areas of future research include replicating these methods in more complex
environments and relating the quality of employee decisions to outcomes such as benefits
satisfaction. Additionally, future research could use this measure to more directly explore the
moral hazard effect associated with health care choices in benefits decision making.
An interesting practical implication of the present findings involves the interaction
between risk aversion and cost sensitivity. Changes in cost-related plan attributes may have
very different effects, depending on the associated risk protection offered by the benefits
choices. In the present study, for example, increases in plan premiums, co-payments or
deductibles have relatively insignificant effects on plan choice for those employees falling to the
left of the zero point in Figure 2. It is only when such changes position employees in the region
to the right of the zero point that cost elasticity becomes a factor. For example, increasing the
premium of Plan A by $100 would only reduce the probability of selecting Plan A by about 4%
for those who previously had RegretB b tween $101 and $200; however, for those who had
RegretB between $1 and 100, the premium increase would be expected to reduce the probability
of selecting Plan A by 12%.
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The present analysis suggests a more precise method of forecasting changes in
employee benefit choices as a result of plan characteristic changes. This method explicitly
considers not only the plan characteristics and the demographics of the employee population,
but how those factors interact to produce OPC, and the role of risk protection. The present study
suggests that research on employee benefit choices can be enhanced by using OPC to
measure incurred OPC directly. We have provided an illustration showing how OPC can be
applied to an actual situation. It is our hope that future research and practice will be more
precise through the use of this new method.
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